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Cartels, managerial incentives, and productive efficiency in 








In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive 
efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, 
Germany’s main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic 
panel data set for up to 28 firms for the years 1881-1913 to measure productive efficiency. We 
show that coal was mined with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it turns out that cartelisa-
tion did not affect productive efficiency. Controlling for corporate governance variables shows 
that stronger managerial incentives were significantly correlated with productive efficiency, 
whereas the debt-equity ratio did not influence it.  
JEL-Classification: N 53, L 41, L 71 
Keywords:  Economic history; Germany pre-1913; Cartel; Productive efficiency; Corporate 
Governance 
 
                                        
*   We would like to thank Martin Hellwig, Felix Höffler, Ulrich Pfister, two anonymous referees, seminar par-
ticipants at the University of Münster, participants of the European Historical Economics Society meeting 
2007 and our colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods for helpful comments 
and suggestions. Darrell Arnold and Brian Cooper substantially improved the writing. All remaining errors 
are the sole responsibility of the authors. In addition, we would like to thank Marina Boland, Kathrin 
Datema, Eva große Kohorst, Annika Petersen, Juliane Schrader, and Hendrik Voss for substantial support in 
collecting the data for this article. An earlier version of this paper was written while the authors were re-
searchers at the Institute of Economic and Social History, University of Münster. Financial support of the 
Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.   
†   email: burhop@coll.mpg.de 2 
I. Introduction 
Economic theory has developed a rich set of predictions regarding the behaviour and success of 
cartels (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006, review the literature). One main conclusion derived from 
theoretical models is that the incentives of individual firms to cheat undermine the stability of 
cartels. Therefore, cartels should be short-lived. Indeed, most cartels break up very quickly, and 
the average duration of a cartel is only about five years. Nevertheless, some cartels survive for 
very long periods. The fact that cartels survive for long periods of time can be taken as evidence 
for economic success, at least from the point of view of the participating firms. Yet, the conse-
quences of long-lived cartels and their impact on economic variables like output, prices, profits, 
and productivity have only been partly identified by empirical research. 
In particular, empirical studies investigating the effects of cartels focus on price data. They par-
tially compare pre-cartel and cartel prices, prices between calm periods and cartel price wars, or 
national and international prices. Price differentials are then taken as evidence for the monopoly 
power of the cartel. Overall, there is substantial evidence that cartels induce rising prices. On the 
other hand, empirical evidence regarding the impact of cartels on other important economic vari-
ables, e.g., on firm profits, market structure, or output, is rare. The effects of cartels on the pro-
ductive efficiency of the cartelised firms have been more or less neglected (Levenstein and Sus-
low, 2006: 84). However, social losses can result not only from rising prices and falling output 
under monopoly conditions, but also from the declining cost efficiency of production.  
Most of the very few empirical studies investigating the relationship between cartels and produc-
tivity focus on productivity growth, i.e., the question whether cartels assist or constrict rises in 
total factor productivity, whereas the question of technical efficiency is neglected. On the one 
hand, Webb (1980) argues that the German steel cartel of the late 19
th and early 20
th century con-
tributed to increased investment and productivity. On the other hand, Fine (1990), as well as 
Broadberry and Crafts (1992), argue that at least part of Britain’s productivity decline during the 
20
th century can be attributed to its permissive attitude towards collusion. Turning to static effi-
ciency, Audretsch (1989) has argued that in post-1945 West Germany cartels were associated 
with reduced output rather than lower costs. This implies that cartels led to reduced cost effi-
ciency.
1 
One reason for the relatively small number of empirical studies regarding the productivity effects 
of cartels might be the difficulty to obtain sufficient data. Most cartels operate secretly since 
many countries make cartels illegal. In the US, for example, cartels have been interdicted since 
the 1890 Sherman Act. Contrary to the US or to modern Germany, cartel agreements were le-
gally binding and enforceable in late 19
th and early 20
th century Germany (see Cheffins, 2003), 
making historical data from Germany an ideal empirical base for testing cartel theories.  
                                        
1    A few authors have investigated the relationship between product-market competition and productivity. 
Winston (1998) reports evidence of productivity gains for a set of industries after deregulation. Zitzewitz 
(2003) finds a positive relationship between product-market competition and productivity in the US and UK 
tobacco industry during the late 19th and early 20th century.  3 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of one of the longest-lasting cartels in the world, the Rhen-
ish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat, RWKS), specifically 
on the productive efficiency of German coal-mining corporations between 1881 and 1913. The 
RWKS was founded in 1893 and was dissolved by the Allied Forces in 1945 (Levenstein and 
Suslow, 2006: 53). It would therefore qualify as a successful cartel if cartel duration is a measure 
of success. The cartel was formed during the period of Germany’s rise to industrial power; this 
rise has traditionally been ascribed to its dynamic steel, chemical, and electrical engineering cor-
porations (Gerschenkron, 1962; Landes, 1969). Germany is often viewed as having overtaken 
Britain by leapfrogging ahead of it, employing an economic model closer to the successful model 
of American managerial capitalism than to the supposedly failed model of British personal capi-
talism (Chandler, 1990). One important component of Germany’s managerial capitalism was the 
coordination of economic activities via various institutional arrangements. Interlocking director-
ates, close relationships between banks and industry, and, last but not least, cartels were coordi-
nation mechanisms well established in Germany at the turn of the 20
th century. Whereas the rele-
vance of interlocking directorates and of close bank-industry relationships has been intensively 
investigated (Fohlin, 2007, reviews the literature), the economic impact of cartels has not been 
fully identified.    
During the early 20
th century, nearly 400 cartels controlled about one-quarter of the total indus-
trial and mining output in Germany. Cartels are supposed to have lessened the intensity of com-
petition and to have led to greater steadiness of production and prices (Kocka, 1978: 563). More-
over, at least some of the cartels might have influenced the allocation of production factors. For 
example, more stable prices and output reduced the risk of cartelized steel firms, which in turn 
induced higher rates of fixed-capital investment. Comparatively high capital-labour ratios then 
resulted in high labour productivity, but without leading to inefficiency due to overinvestment 
(Webb, 1980). In addition, it seems that at least some cartels did not achieve excess profits. More 
specifically, Peters (1989) argues that the RWKS primarily aimed to stabilise prices and output 
and not to achieve excess profits. This hypothesis is supported by the findings of Bittner (2002, 
2005); he shows that the formation of the RWKS in 1893 did not led to excess returns for the 
participating firms in the stock market. Yet, perhaps the managers of cartelized coal mining cor-
porations did not use market power to attain pecuniary monopoly profits. This could explain the 
poor stock market reaction to cartel formation. Perhaps they followed a strategy hypothesised by 
Hicks (1935), i.e., that the best monopoly profit is a quiet life for the manager. Germany’s mana-
gerial capitalism would then have been less successful than supposed by Chandler (1990).
2  
Since Hicks proposed his famous hypothesis, the managerial economy has been investigated in 
more detail theoretically. In particular, in a world with symmetric information between managers 
and owners of a company, managers will minimise costs; as a result, the company is technically 
                                        
2   Moreover, Chandler (1990) figured out that cartelisation instead of mergers impeded the emergence of effi-
cient firm sizes in Germany. Consequently, productivity was substantially lower in Germany than in the U.S. 
In addition, Tullock (1967) argues that a monopolist will use at least some of his rent to defend his position, 
e.g., by influencing the government or by prohibiting market entry. These activities consume resources, and 
therefore productive efficiency declines.  4 
efficient. Yet, if asymmetric information between managers and shareholders exists, managers 
need to be motivated, e.g., by bonus payments, to achieve the first-best solution. The optimal 
design of such managerial incentives is influenced by product market competition – along with 
other factors. First of all, if managers can describe monopoly profits as profits resulting from 
managerial effort, the signal received by the principal becomes more diffuse and it becomes 
more difficult to design incentives optimally (Hart, 1983). In addition, low product market com-
petition reduces the bankruptcy risk of firms – and thereby the lay-off risk for managers – which 
might reduce managerial effort and company efficiency. However, if managers get a share of the 
profit, they still put effort into the firm. Moreover, since the marginal return of managerial effort 
is higher in a world with low product market competition, managers will increase their effort and 
thereby the efficiency of the firm (Schmidt, 1997). In addition, the negative correlation between 
market power and bankruptcy risk can be counteracted by the principals via the choice of the 
financial structure of the firm. Bankruptcy risk increases with the debt-equity ratio; therefore, the 
effects of market power on the managerial effort can be counteracted by increasing debt relative 
to equity (Aghion et al., 1999). Thus, the effects of cartel formation on productive efficiency can 
only be fully accounted for if corporate governance variables are taken into consideration.    
If managers actually enjoyed a quiet life, instead of the hard life of profit-maximising agents, 
cartelised coal mines would exhibit lower productive efficiency. We test this hypothesis by esti-
mating a stochastic frontier model using input and output data of up to 28 coal mining corpora-
tions for the period 1881-1913. It turns out that the productive efficiency of coal-mining corpora-
tions was not significantly affected by cartel membership. Moreover, a high debt-equity ratio 
also left productive efficiency unaffected. On the other hand, productive efficiency was signifi-
cantly higher in firms that paid large bonuses to their board members. This indicates that com-
pensation schemes were more important for conserving productive efficiency than competitive 
pressure from product markets or the higher bankruptcy risk of highly leveraged firms.    
The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows. In Section II, we describe the organi-
sation of coal mining in Germany between 1880 and the First World War. Data sources and de-
scriptive statistics are presented in Section III. In Section IV, we outline the econometric method 
employed. In Section V, we measure firm-level productive efficiency using stochastic frontier 
analysis. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II.   The Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate 
The three decades from the 1880s to World War I constitute the later phase of Germany’s indus-
trialisation. Real net national product increased by 159 percent between 1880 and 1913 and in-
dustrial output by 202 percent (Burhop and Wolff, 2005). One important factor behind this rapid 
growth was coal, the main energy source of the day. In particular, metal production, metal proc-
essing, chemicals, mining, and transportation relied on coal as an input factor. Furthermore, coal 
was an important consumption good, used as heating material in the growing urban centres in 5 
Germany (Holtfrerich, 1973: 129-154).
3 Coal was basically supplied by four sources. The most 
important German mining districts were the Ruhr district in the west, the Saar area in the south-
west, and Silesia in the east of the empire. Furthermore, coal was imported from Britain via 
Hamburg, Germany’s primary seaport. The most important source was the Ruhr district, whose 
mines supplied about 48 percent of German coal output in 1880 and about 58 percent in 1913 
(Jahrbuch, 1914: 748). 
The quantitative importance of Ruhr coal mining for the German economy is one reason for fo-
cusing on it. Moreover, the industrial organisation of coal mining in the Ruhr district differed 
significantly from the organisation in other parts of Germany. In the Ruhr district, mining was 
almost exclusively performed by publicly traded corporations, organised either as corporations 
(Aktiengesellschaft) or as Gewerkschaft.
4 In the Saar area, the Prussian state was by far the larg-
est player. In Upper Silesia, the government also had significant shares in output, but in this area, 
most of the coal fields were privately owned and extracted by East-Elbian aristocrats (Pieren-
kemper 1992; Walker, 1904: 34-35). 
Already at the end of the 1870s, collusion had become a prominent phenomenon in the Ruhr dis-
trict. By coordinating individual behaviour, the mining firms sought to eliminate what they 
thought to be “unhealthy” (ungesunde) competition, and thereby to secure what was called “suf-
ficient” (auskömmliche) prices and profits.
5 Early efforts were aimed at controlling either output 
or prices. Moreover, even if more sophisticated coordination techniques were used, they were 
restricted to local areas and lacked mechanisms to punish defectors. As a result, up to the begin-
ning of the 1890s, all collusive arrangements were ineffective in pursuing their goals, and they 
therefore eventually failed.
6 
In 1893, 98 firms, representing 87 percent of the coal output from the Ruhr district (Passow, 
1911: 68), joined to form the RWKS, commonly referred to as the most powerful collusive ar-
rangement in Imperial Germany (Parnell, 1994: 29). Its original treaty was revised twice, first in 
1896 and for a second time in 1903. With the latter revision, the vertically integrated iron and 
steel producers, the foundry mines (Hüttenzechen), of the district, which had abstained from 
membership up to then, joined the cartel. As a result, coal extraction in the Ruhr district was al-
most completely cartelised (the market share at the end of 1903 was 98.7 percent). 
                                        
3   Between 1904 and 1912, about 40 percent of coal was consumed by the iron and steel industry, 15 percent by 
private households, and 10 percent by railways. Moreover, 10 percent were exported.  
4   A Gewerkschaft was a legal type of enterprise exclusively designed for mining. Its capital was divided in (up 
to 1,000) mining shares (called Kux), which did not represent a certain amount of capital, but a percentage 
share of the firm. In contrast to corporations, the owner of a Kux did not only profit from distributions (called 
Ausbeute), but was also obliged to remargin capital (called Zubuße) to finance investments or accrued losses. 
Moreover, since they were registered, the trading of a Kux was subject to harsher restrictions than the buying 
or selling of stocks (Friedrich, 1979). 
5   The cited terms can be found in the annual reports of the Verein für die bergbaulichen Interessen im Ober-
bergamtsbezirk Dortmund, cited in Passow (1911). 
6   A detailed description of the predecessors of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate can be found in Verein 
(1904b). 6 
The RWKS was a price- and quota-setting cartel.
7 In addition, it managed the sales of its mem-
bers’ production. Every participating firm had to commit itself to sell its entire output to the car-
tel, which in return was obliged to purchase it. Mines that failed to meet their delivery require-
ments without a valid excuse were punished with a fine. The prices the RWKS charged its cus-
tomers varied according to the place where the respective coal was sold. In what was known as 
the ‘undisputed area’ (unbestrittenes Gebiet), the cartel enjoyed advantages in transportation 
costs that prohibited outsiders from competing. Here, it fixed its prices annually. Variations were 
only allowed to account for differences in quality. In contrast, prices in the disputed area (bestrit-
tenes Gebiet) were determined competitively. If they fell short of those in the noncompetitive 
region, the cartel would compensate for the difference. The compensations (as well as the cartel 
bureaucracy) were financed by a variable percentage deduction from the monthly revenues that 
the cartel transferred to its members (Umlage). 
Production was regulated by assigning each member a participation figure (Beteiligungsziffer), 
which was allotted on the basis of members’ production levels in either 1891 or 1892. The fig-
ures were expressed in tons of coal production, but served as quotas that defined a member’s 
share in total output, since the sum of the individual participation figures represented the maxi-
mum production capacity of the cartel. In practice, this maximum was hardly ever realized, be-
cause the cartel authorities could reduce total output by applying a common percentage reduction 
to each member’s figure if they judged the production capacity to surpass demand.
8 Cartel mem-
bers that exceeded their production allowance were punished with severe fines. Mines, which 
had to produce below their allowed output due to quality problems or delivery commitments, 
received subsidies. 
Given the duration, the impressive market share, and the seemingly tight organization, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the RWKS was effective in controlling prices and output. On average, 
price variations for coal declined after the cartel formation.
9 Moreover, the cartel nearly achieved 
its output target in most years (Peters, 1981: 146). Yet, there were obstacles that might have pre-
vented the cartel from successfully pursuing its cause. One reason may be that,  due to the large 
number of firms, negotiation and monitoring costs were presumably high. Moreover, cost struc-
tures were heterogeneous since the geological conditions varied substantially between mines in 
the north and the south of the Ruhr district. Finally, the industry was dynamically growing and 
the output of cartel outsiders was continuously increasing.
10 
Furthermore, Peters (1981, 1989) has persuasively argued that the long duration of the RWKS 
was largely due to the flexibility of its contracts. In particular, the regulation of output allowed 
the cartel members to behave individualistically. Their participation figures were not perma-
                                        
7   The texts of the three contracts are published in Verein (1904b). 
8   Between 1893 and 1914, there were only two years (1900, 1907) when no reduction was enforced (Peters, 
1981: 144-145). 
9   Coal prices are available at the NBER historical statistics homepage.  
10   Up to 1903, the most important outsiders in the undisputed territory were the foundry mines. After 1903, the 
Prussian state became increasingly important. 7 
nently fixed. There were several different ways to increase them.
11 During the period in which 
the first two contracts were valid (1893-1903), a member could automatically increase his par-
ticipation figure if he sank a new production shaft.
12 When this was registered, the cartel authori-
ties had almost no means to reject the request for a higher quota. Moreover, all firms could re-
quest a higher participation figure for already existing shafts. In contrast to the procedure applied 
for new shafts, the responsible body of the RWKS could refuse an increase if it judged that the 
coal market was incapable of dealing with extra production. The takeover of another cartel 
member was a third way to achieve a higher participation ratio, without changing the sum of 
production allowances. Subsequently, the re-allocation of production allowances among firms 
via takeovers could be one way to achieve a higher technical efficiency on average, since firms 
could shut down the least efficient shafts.
13  
Between 1893 and 1913, the sum of the individual production allowances rose from 35.4 to 84.1 
million tons (Jahrbuch, 1914: LXX). Many new shafts were drilled to get an additional quota: 
new shafts were sunk and then closed again as soon as the higher quota was assigned; ventilation 
shafts were converted to extraction shafts; single shafts were equipped with additional extraction 
facilities and thereby turned into double shafts, which were counted as two shafts (Peters 1981, 
1989). In effect, the constant changes in the relative and absolute importance among its members 
must have seriously hampered the ability of the cartel bodies to control output effectively.
14 
Finally, simply looking at the combined market shares of its members overstates the market 
power of the RWKS. First of all, the cartel sold less than 50 percent of its total output in the un-
disputed territory; the remaining coal had to be marketed at competitive prices (Wiedenfeld, 
1912: 79, 101). Furthermore, occasionally exports had to be subsidised with revenues from sales 
in the undisputed territory, as they were conducted below domestic market prices. Moreover, 
collusion on the demand side or large customers might have restricted the market power of the 
RWKS. For example, 40 percent of the coal was supplied to the iron and steel industry, which 
was also cartelized to some extent. In addition, ten percent of the coal was supplied to railways, 
which were mainly state-owned. Yet, the impact of downstream market power on the price for-
mation at the coal market has never been investigated.
15 In addition, after the second revision of 
the contract the grip of the cartel on the output of its members began to loosen. Right from the 
                                        
11   For an individual firm, a higher participation figure was extremely desirable: If other members did not in-
crease their figures simultaneously, an enlargement would result in a higher individual share in total output. 
By this, the respective cartel member could augment its coal production and circumvent reductions enforced 
by the cartel authorities. In addition, the weight in the price- and production-setting committees of the RWKS 
depended on the share in total output. If fellow colluders also increased their production allowances, an 
enlargement of one’s own participation figure was necessary to at least keep one’s relative position in the or-
ganisation. 
12   The participation figure was then increased by 120,000 tons. 
13   All three contracts stipulated that the members of the RWKS were allowed to distribute freely their individ-
ual quota among their production facilities. Thus, since acquiring a cartel member also meant taking over its 
participation figure, an acquiring firm could redistribute output to its most efficient facilities without restric-
tion. 
14   Between 1895 and 1914, the actual output of the cartel exceeded the projected output in eleven of twenty 
years (Peters, 1981: 147). 
15   See, e.g., Webb (1980) and Feldenkirchen (1982: 110-124) for a description of the industrial organisation of 
the iron and steel industry.  8 
foundation of the RWKS, the coal used to run operations (Selbstverbrauch) was excluded from 
the members’ delivery commitments. Up to 1903, these provisions applied to the share of output 
that was needed to run steam engines and used to produce coke or briquettes. Although it did not 
have to be delivered to the cartel, it was nonetheless subject to control through the quota regime. 
After 1903, the coal for running iron and steel works was also declared to be a part of the 
Selbstverbrauch. Moreover, in order to persuade the vertically integrated firms to join the or-
ganisation, coal for self-use was no longer controlled by cartel quotas. 
III.   Data sources and descriptive statistics  
Our sample covers up to 28 mining corporations from the Ruhr district. Data about Gewerk-
schaften could not be obtained, as they were not obliged to publish the same details about their 
business operations as corporations were. The firms in the sample represent between 28 percent 
(in 1881) and 58 percent (in 1907) of the coal output from this region and 14 percent (in 1881) to 
33 percent (in 1907) of the German coal output. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 










   Cartel  period 
Coal output in tons  1,173,752 1,501,965 1,607,747 497,033 
Number of workers  4,389 5,688 6,055 2,204 
Capital stock in Marks  24,268,828 31,089,364 32,963,540 13,284,699 
Return on capital  8.5%  8.8%  8.5%  15.6% 
Incentive pay for board members in 
Marks  73,574 96,671  101,360  52,119 
Profit share of board   3.6% 3.5% 3.6% 2.5% 
Debt  ratio  24.8% 27.3% 26.5% 34.7% 
Number of cross sections  28  28  28  4 
Number of observations  633  420  380  40 
Source: see Appendix 1 and 2. 
 
Output and input data were collected from a variety of sources. See Appendices 1 and 2 for a 
detailed list of firms included in our sample and the exact sources. To estimate a production fron-
tier, output and input measures are required. Our output measure is tons of coal produced during 
a year; input measures are the number of workers
16 and the value of the fixed assets of a firm, 
calculated from balance-sheet data. Accounting figures do not necessarily display the economic 
value of assets; we therefore apply the perpetual inventory method to compute the capital stock 
                                        
16   We implicitly assume an identical relation between total employment and the underground workers for all 
firms. Furthermore, one should note that the number of annual working hours per underground worker was 
nearly constant over the whole period under consideration.  9 
of firms. We use a method proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981). Following their approach, 
the book value of a firm is adjusted for investment, depreciation, price changes, and the techno-




Figure 1: Labour productivity and capital intensity of our sample of Ruhr district coal mining corporations, 
1881-1913. Source: see Appendix 1. 
 
The aggregated input and output figures of the sample clearly show the continuing growth proc-
ess that characterised the German mining industry between 1881 and 1913. The coal extraction 
of the 28 firms increased from 5.7 million tons to 43.9 million tons (682 percent); capital input 
increased from 135.5 million Marks to 865.3 million Marks (538 percent), and labour input from 
19,315 workers to 150,890 workers (681 percent). As can be seen in Figure 1, labour productiv-
ity, measured in tons per worker, was thus nearly constant, whereas the capital intensity slightly 
declined between 1881 and 1913.
17 
The average coal output of a firm in our sample was nearly 1.2 million tons annually from 1881 
to 1913. This output was produced using a capital stock valued at about 24.3 million Marks and 
by employing nearly 4,400 underground workers. During the cartel period (1893-1913), the out-
                                        
17   This finding contradicts Holtfrerich’s (1973) hypothesis of a rising capital intensity. He based the argument 
on the number of installed horse-powers per worker. As a matter of fact, installed horse-powers per worker 
increased by about 60 percent from the 1880s until the early 20th century (Jahrbuch, various issues). On the 
other hand, the number of shafts per worker decreased by at least 34 percent over the same period (Jahrbuch, 
various issues; Verein, 1904a). The accounting data employed in this paper account for these diverging 
trends of different capital input types.  10 
put, labour input, as well as capital input of cartelized firms were about 2.5 times larger than of 
non-cartelized firms. Labour productivity was higher in cartelized firms, whereas capital input 
per worker was higher in non-cartelized firms.
18 Non-cartelized firms were much more profitable 
than cartelized firms; the profit share paid by them to the managers was smaller; and the debt 
ratio was higher.  
22 of the firms were only engaged in coal mining; the remaining six were vertically integrated 
foundry mines. All of the included firms used a similar technology in exploiting their fields. Due 
to the characteristic of the coal deposits in the Ruhr area, it was almost exclusively mined with 
vertically sunk shafts.
19 Moreover, the technology used to mine the coal seams was, with slight 
variations, identical: hand labour dominated; mechanical extraction machines were almost com-
pletely absent up to the turn of the century; afterwards they were only slowly accepted (Burg-
hardt, 1995; Hoffmann, 1965: 59-60). In contrast to the similarities in the production technology, 
there were presumably differences between firms from different parts of the district that could 
have influenced productivity significantly. Mines situated in the south were faced with thinner 
and less even seams than those in the north. The output of the former displayed a lower ratio of 
coal to stone. These disadvantages were partly offset by the fact that extraction shafts in the 
northern part of the district had to be deeper in order to reach deposits that were worth exploiting 
(Bergmann, 1937; Brown, 1993: 203-229).  
The production technology seemed to be similar not only for different firms, but also over time. 
Labour productivity was nearly constant, and capital intensity was only slightly declining. More-
over, a rather simple estimate of the total factor productivity shows that it was nearly constant 
between 1881 and 1913. Under the simplifying assumptions of constant returns to scale and a 
labour share of 0.8, the total factor productivity – normalized to 1881 = 100 – was 105.4 between 
1881 and 1892 and 99.6 between 1893 and 1913.
20 
Besides inputs like capital and labour, theory suggests that market structure, managerial incen-
tives, and capital structure could influence efficiency. We use data about performance-related 
remuneration paid to the executive board and to the supervisory board to measure managerial 
incentives. The capital structure of each firm is factored into the estimation via the quotient of 
debt over total assets, the debt ratio. Incentive payments to board members were – in Marks as 
well as in the share in profits – significantly higher in cartelised than in non-cartelised firms. 
This is a first indication that principals substituted weaker incentives from product market com-
petition with stronger monetary incentives. On the other hand, the disciplining force of high debt 
levels was used much more intensively in non-cartelized firms.  
                                        
18   This contradicts Webb (1980). He hypothesised that cartel membership fostered investment in physical capi-
tal.   
19   In 1885, the average depth of the shafts in the Ruhr district was 342 metres. In 1908, it was 460 metres. At 
the eve of the First World War, the maximum depth of up to 1,000 metres was reached (Bosenick, 1906: 30; 
Goldschmidt, 1912: 11; Jahrbuch, 1914). 
20   The difference between the two sub-periods is statistically insignificant.  11 
Another important external force influencing managerial effort is competitive pressure from 
product markets. Product market competition can be measured in a number of ways, for example 
by the market share of the largest three corporations or a Herfindahl index. However, our 
econometric method uses company-level data. Therefore, aggregated data about market power 
are inadequate. We measure the influence of the cartel’s market power on the productive effi-
ciency of a firm by a dummy variable, taking the value of one if the firm was a member of the 
RWKS during a given year. Moreover, we address the effect of the cartel’s existence on the pro-
ductive efficiency of all firms by a dummy variable taking the value of one for all post-1892 ob-
servations. 
A direct approach to measure market power is the calculation of the Lerner-Index, i.e., the ratio 
of prices to marginal costs. In the case of perfectly competitive markets, prices equal marginal 
costs and the price-costs margin therefore takes the value of one. Therefore, price-cost margins 
higher than one indicate market power. However, calculation of marginal costs is quite difficult. 
Therefore, we computed the ratio of prices to average costs for a sub-sample of about one-third 
of our sample. In general, average costs do not equal marginal costs if fixed costs and decreasing 
returns to scale characterise the production process. Thus, the level of our quasi-Lerner index is 
uninformative. Nevertheless, a shift in the level of the index after the cartel formation in 1893 
serves as an indicator of rising market power under the additional assumptions of constant pro-
duction functions. Yet, the ratio of prices to average costs was roughly constant between 1881 
and 1913. These results casts doubt on the effectiveness of the cartel agreement.   
 
 
Figure 2: Price-average cost-margin for a sub-sample of corporations, 1881-1913.  
Source: see Appendix 1. 
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IV.   Econometric method  
A standard tool for the estimation of productive inefficiency is stochastic frontier analysis 
(Greene, 2003: 501; Sickles, 2005). Basically, a production function y = f(x) describes the rela-
tionship between a set of input factors x and output y. For any given x, y must be equal to or less 
than f(x), i.e., production always takes place on or below the maximum level of the production 
function. For an empirical regression model of y = f(x) + ε, this theoretical consideration implies 
that the error term ε must be negative. The canonical solution to this problem was proposed by 
Aigner et al. (1977). In this framework, any deviation from the production function could arise 
from two sources: productive inefficiency and idiosyncratic effects that could be either positive 
or negative. In addition, we add firm-specific fixed-effects fi and ϕi to the model to capture fixed 
characteristics of the coal mines, i.e., geological differences between them.
21 
More formally, we estimate production functions described by equations (1a) and (1b). Equation 
(1a) describes the very general translog production function, whereas (1b) is the standard Cobb-
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Equations (1a) and (1b) are production functions with two inputs, labour Li and capital Ki for 
firms i = 1,…,28 and periods t = 1881,….,1913. Both inputs capital K and labour L, as well as 
tons of coal output Y, are in logs. In addition, we estimate a translog production function using 
the specification proposed by Corbo and Meller (1979) and Greene (1980). Yet, the econometric 
results presented in Table 2 – see below – shows that the additional parameters in the translog 
model are insignificant and we therefore turn to the simpler Cobb-Douglas production function.  
Furthermore, we have company- and period-specific random components vi,t as well as company- 
and period-specific inefficiency components ui,t. The term vi,t captures time- and company-
specific idiosyncratic effects, which are normally distributed with a mean of zero. The term ui,t 
captures company-specific inefficiencies. These company-specific inefficiencies are censored at 
zero and can follow different distributions. In the general setting outlined in equations (1a) and 
(1b), the company-specific inefficiencies follow a truncated normal distribution, which is only 
defined on the positive orthant with a possibly non-zero modus µi. The modus µi can be param-
eterised by employing the mean of company-specific and time-invariant characteristics zi. For 
example, we use the log of the average bonus payments to board members of corporation i dur-
ing the period 1881-1913 to explain the firm specific technical inefficiency ui; see equation (2). 
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In equation (2), µi is the measure of firm-specific inefficiency, explained by the log of the mean 
bonus payments to board members of firm i during the years 1881,...,Ti with observations for 
firm i. In addition, we employ the log of the mean dummy variable indicating cartel membership 
as a measure of market power and an additional corporate governance variable, the log of the 
mean debt ratio, to explain average inefficiency. In the baseline specification, we simply assume 
that µi=0, i.e., we do not explain productive inefficiency.
22  
First of all, the regression yields the parameters of the production function. We can therefore 
identify the relative importance of capital and labour in the production process. Second, the sum 
of the regression coefficients α1 and α2 (or a1 and a2) can be used to test whether the production 
function has constant returns to scale. Finally, we can calculate productive inefficiency for each 
firm according to Jondrow et al. (1982). Moreover, the aggregate inefficiency for the whole 
population of firms can be calculated as the mean of company-specific inefficiencies.  
V. Results     
Table 2 shows the results using the translog production function (1a), whereas Table 3 shows the 
results using the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas production function (1b). Both production func-
tions are estimated using three different specifications regarding the distributions of the firm-
specific inefficiency term. The baseline specification is a fixed effects model with the additional 
assumption that the firm-specific inefficiencies follow a half-normal distribution with modus 0. 
In addition, we check the distributional assumption for the inefficiency term by comparing it 
with models using a truncated normal or an exponential distribution for the inefficiency term.  
The decisive difference between the translog production function and the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function is that the former does not restrict the values of the elasticity of substitution and it 
does not assume strong separability among input factors. It turns out that all additional parame-
ters of the function are nearly zero and insignificant in all three specifications.
 23 Furthermore, 
the variance parameters σ and λ are not identified if we employ the truncated normal assumption 
                                        
22   We estimate the deep parameters of equations (1a), (1b), and (2) using maximum-likelihood (for details, see 
Horrance and Schmidt, 1996).  
23   The insignificance of the additional coefficients is most likely induced by multicollinearity of K and L with 
K*L, K², and L². Therefore, following Greene (1980), translog production functions are estimated using a 
system approach. Yet, the decomposition of the translog production function into single equations rests on 
the assumptions of competitive markets and constant returns to scale. Both assumptions are most likely not 
fulfilled in our setting and we therefore opt for the simple Cobb-Douglas production function. Moreover, this 
keeps our results comparable to Holtfrerich’s (1973) results, which are based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. 14 
regarding the distribution of the inefficiency term. Consequently, we do not employ this variant 
of the stochastic frontier model in the following analysis. Finally, the results presented in Table 2 
– as well as those presented in Table 3 – point to the superiority of the exponential model, using 
the log-likelihood as a measure. However, the exponential specification is only available for the 
simple estimation of technical inefficiency. It is not possible to employ the exponential model if 
the aim is to parameterize the inefficiency term. Yet, the point estimates of the production func-
tion are quite similar for all three specifications. Consequently, the imprecision resulting from 
employing the normal-half normal model should be small.     
 
Table 2: Baseline regression results I: Translog-production function 
Dependent variable: Log of coal output in tons 
   Regression I  Regression II  Regression III 
  Half-normal model  Truncated normal model Exponential  model
   Coefficient p-value Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value
Log(labour) 0.650  0.000  0.593 0.000  0.592  0.000 
Log(capital) 0.146  0.187 0.152  0.221 0.152  0.151 
Log(labour)² -0.012  0.486 0.002  0.899 0.002  0.897 
Log(capital)² -0.007  0.266  -0.004 0.519  -0.004  0.528 
Log(labour)*Log(capital)  0.023 0.298  0.011  0.566 0.011  0.616 
Wald-test on constant returns to scale  0.796  0.000  0.745 0.000  0.744  0.000 
λ or τ  2.544 0.000  24.907  0.951 11.392  0.000 
σ  0.169 0.000  1.754  0.951 0.071  0.000 
Number of cross sections  28  28  28 
Number of observations  633  633  633 
Log likelihood  503.6  518.7  518.8 
Method: Fixed-effects stochastic frontier. Log(labour) is log of employees. Log(capital) is  
log of capital stock calculated from accounting data using perpetual inventory method.  
 
The parameter values of the production function displayed in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that coal 
mining in the late 19
th- and early 20
th- century Ruhr district was labour intensive, with slightly 
decreasing economies of scale: the sum of the coefficients for labour (0.837) and capital (0.093) 
takes a value significantly below one (see Table 3, Regression I). In part, this result concurs with 
the literature on coal mining in the Ruhr district. The great importance of the production factor 
labour is a common theme in studies on mining in the Ruhr district. Empirical evidence is pre-
sented by Effertz (1895: 9) and Jüngst (1906: 14-18). They find that labour costs constituted 
roughly 60 percent of the total costs per ton of coal in the Ruhr district. Moreover, Holtfrerich’s 
(1973: 89-90) estimates of the shares of capital and labour in net value added emphasise the 
great importance of the latter factor.  
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Table 3: Baseline regression results II: Cobb-Douglas-production function 
Dependent variable: Log of coal output in tons 
   Regression I  Regression II  Regression III 
  Half-normal model  Truncated normal model Exponential  model
   Coefficient p-value Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value
Log(labour) 0.837  0.000  0.806 0.000  0.806  0.000 
Log(capital) 0.093  0.000 0.117  0.000 0.117  0.000 
Wald-test on constant returns to scale  0.930  0.000  0.923 0.000  0.923  0.000 
λ or τ  2.509 0.000  24.077  0.953 11.519  0.000 
σ  0.168 0.000  1.733  0.953 0.718  0.000 
Number of cross sections  28  28  28 
Number of observations  633  633  633 
Log likelihood  502.9  516.9  517.0 
Method: Fixed-effects stochastic frontier. Log(labour) is log of employees. Log(capital) is  
log of capital stock calculated from accounting data using perpetual inventory method.  
 
Other econometric results conflict with conventional views on coal mining in the Ruhr district. 
Our finding that there are decreasing returns to scale is at odds with the dominant view in both 
contemporary and modern studies. The former commonly note that fixed costs in coal mining 
were substantial and that, in general, increases in output were accompanied by decreasing aver-
age costs (Reuss, 1892: 77). However, marginal costs are not considered, because almost all of 
the contemporary writers have been influenced by the non-marginalistic German historical 
school of economics. Holtfrerich (1973), on the other hand, argues for constant returns to scale. 
He states that for contemporaries engaged in mining, the introduction of vertically sunk extrac-
tion shafts meant access to a practically indefinite number of equally profitability coal deposits.
24 
Moreover, he holds that increasing output by reaching out to deeper seated coal seams had mixed 
effects on returns to scale, which levelled each other out. On the one hand, the underground 
transportation distance for the extracted coal increased; but on the other hand, due to the geology 
of the Ruhr district, deeper seated coal seams were generally thicker and flatter and more evenly 
stratified than those closer to the surface. 
Our estimates offer no support for the views of contemporaries. Moreover, Holtfrerich (1973) 
seems too optimistic about the positive effects of vertically sunk shafts. Without doubt, introduc-
ing them dramatically increased the number of accessible coal deposits. However, there still was 
a large amount of uncertainty about the stratification of coal seams, even those near existing pro-
duction facilities. In addition, Holtfrerich omits increases in output that were achieved by ex-
panding the horizontal dispersion of mining activity, where the prospect of more rewarding coal 
                                        
24   Holtfrerich implicitly says that the Hotelling effect (Hotelling, 1931) was overcome. Hotelling states that 
productivity in mining will decline over time, if deposits are fixed and known, technological progress is con-
stant, and deposits are extracted in order of their quality (starting with the best). Following Holtfrerich, with 
the adoption of vertical shafts the definity of deposits and thus also the necessarily declining quality of the 
extracted seams were no longer given for contemporaries engaged in coal mining. 16 
seams was less probable than in cases where an output expansion was achieved by reaching to 
deeper deposits. Furthermore, he seemingly underestimates the negative repercussions of rising 
production. First, a larger dispersion of mining activity in any direction was not only accompa-
nied by increases in the underground transportation distance of the extracted coal. Of equal im-
portance was the fact that it also lengthened the distance of the workers to the actual extraction 
points.
25 It also meant that the surveillance of workers became increasingly difficult and costly. 
Second, the costs of preparing, maintaining, and securing coal seams, as well as those of dehy-
dration and ventilation, increased over-proportionally to rising production. Moreover, until 1903, 
the cartel contract set an incentive to add new shafts to the production sites to get a higher quota. 
Therefore, the size and distribution of investments was influenced by the design of the cartel 
contract. Consequently, inefficient investments could induce inefficiencies. In a nutshell, there 
are various reasons for our finding of decreasing returns to scale. Innovations, e.g., changes in 
the extraction methods, the mechanisation of transportation and the extraction, were slowly start-
ing to be adopted in the 1890s. However, up to the First World War, much of what would have 
been recommended was still at an experimental stage. Moreover, partial innovations at one stage 
of the production process had negative repercussions on other links in the chain (Burghardt, 
1995). 
Of greater interest for our main research question are the results for the inefficiency parameter. 
The parameters of the production function estimated by our baseline regression using the Cobb-
Douglas production function and the assumption of a half-normally distributed error term lead to 
an estimation of the mean inefficiency of Ruhr coal mining corporations of about 11.7 percent.
26 
To deepen the analysis, we test whether certain variables – e.g., proxies for product market com-
petition or the quality of corporate governance – influenced productive efficiency. Table 4 dis-
plays the results of equations (1b) and (2) if we allow for a heterogeneous mean µi. The results 
regarding the coefficients of the production function are not much influenced by the inclusion of 









                                        
25   From 1889 onwards – as a result of a mine worker strike – the time getting to the extraction points was in-
creasingly considered part of the working hours (Jüngst, 1908: 134). 
26   The mean inefficiency derived from the truncated normal (exponential) model is 8.4 (8.5) percent. 17 
Table 4: Explaining productive efficiency 
Dependent variable: Log of coal output in tons 
   Regression I  Regression II  Regression III 
   Coefficient  p-value Coefficient  p-value Coefficient  p-value 
Log(labour) 0.831  0.000  0.835 0.000 0.822 0.000 
Log(capital) 0.099  0.000 0.095 0.000 0.106 0.000 
Wald-test on constant returns 
to scale  0.930 0.000 0.930 0.000 0.928 0.000 
Log of mean of firm specific  
RWKS membership      0.009 0.846 0.101 0.516 
Log of mean of firm specific  
debt ratio  0.011  0.844      
Log of mean of firm specific 
bonus payments (in 1,000 Mark)  -0.035 0.059      -0.043 0.090 
λ  3.347 0.000 2.509 0.000 3.676 0.000 
σ  0.233 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.262 0.000 
Number of cross sections  28  28  28 
Number of observations  633  633  633 
Log likelihood  510.9  502.9  511.2 
Method: Fixed-effects stochastic frontier. Half-normal model.  Log(labour) is log of employees.  
Log(capital) is log of capital stock calculated from accounting data using perpetual inventory method.  
 
It turns out that company-specific inefficiency cannot be explained using the RWKS member-
ship dummy (see Table 4, Regression II). The coefficient is statistically insignificant. However, a 
dummy variable might be too imprecise to measure the effects of the cartel. Consequently, we 
use additional information available for a sub-sample of our firms to calculate the price-cost 
margin of coal mines. The results presented in Table 5, Regression I, show, however, that the 
price-cost margin is – like the RWKS dummy variable – statistically insignificant.  
Furthermore, standard oligopoly theory shows that a merger of firms in a Cournot oligopoly will 
not increase the joint-profit of the merged firms, but instead increase the profits of the remaining 
independent market participants (Shapiro and Farrell, 1990). A similar argument could be at 
work in the case of the RWKS: the cartel reduced the product market competition not only for 
the cartel members, but also for the non-cartelized firms. Thus, the productive efficiency of all 
firms should decline after the cartel formation in 1893. Yet, the results shown in Table 5, Re-
gression II show that a post-1893 dummy variable, which should pick up this effect, is statisti-
cally insignificant. 








Table 5: Explaining productive efficiency – Stability tests 
Dependent variable: Log of coal output in tons 
   Regression I  Regression II 
    Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Log(labour)  0.818 0.000 0.846 0.000 
Log(capital)  0.078 0.137 0.089 0.000 
Wald-test on constant returns 
to scale  0.896 0.000 0.935 0.000 
Post-1893 dummy       0.029  0.279 
Log of mean of price-cost margin  0.025  0.755     
λ  1.887 0.000 2.442 0.000 
σ  0.145 0.000 0.163 0.000 
Number of cross sections  13  28 
Number of observations  232  633 
Log likelihood  214.5  503.2 
Method: Fixed-effects stochastic frontier. Half-normal model.  Log(labour) is log of employees.  
Log(capital) is log of capital stock calculated from accounting data using perpetual inventory method. 
 
Therefore, we take an intermediate position between the views regarding the impact of cartels on 
productive efficiency. On the one hand, Feldenkirchen (1982: 113) and Wengenroth (1998) 
based their hypotheses on these contemporaries’ views that cartels hampered the cost efficiency 
of cartelised companies. On the other hand, Pierenkemper (2000: 236, 244) figured out that the 
only way to increase firm profits was to reduce costs, since output prices were fixed by the car-
tel. Therefore, cartels should have improved cost efficiency. Our results show that cartel forma-
tion did not affect the productive efficiency of coal mines.  
Furthermore, in the specification underlying the results of Table 4, we aim to explain productive 
efficiency by differences in the corporate governance of firms. In particular, we investigate 
whether performance-related managerial compensation or differences in the financial structure of 
the corporations can explain productive inefficiency. The relationship between product market 
competition, financial structure, and managerial incentives is debated by modern economists. On 
the one hand, lower product market competition may weaken the incentives of agents since prin-
cipals are worse informed about agents’ actions (Hart, 1983) or because the threat of bankruptcy 
declines with rising market power (Schmidt, 1997). Yet, the risk of bankruptcy can be increased 
by altering the financial structure of firms. Firms with a higher debt ratio can reduce the mone-
tary motivation of managers (Aghion et al., 1999). Moreover, debt holders, e.g., bankers, also 
monitor agents’ efforts, and if creditors detect managerial inefficiency, creditors might call in 
their money, thereby increasing the liquidation risk of the firm.
27 On the other hand, declining 
product-market competition increases the marginal return of managerial effort, and therefore 
weaker product market competition can induce the manager to work harder (Schmidt, 1997). 
Moreover, since market shares, output, and prices were more or less fixed by the cartel agree-
ment, the only possible way to increase profits was to lower costs, i.e., to be more efficient. Fi-
                                        
27   Fohlin (2007, Chapter 5) provides an excellent review of the relevance of bank monitoring during the late 
19th and early 20th century for firm performance.  19 
nally, weak product-market competition can alter the market structure since new firms enter the 
market. A model by Raith (2003) predicts that new companies will intensify competition and the 
marginal return of managerial effort will thus remain constant. Moreover, he shows that lower 
competition accompanies lower managerial incentives. However, Raith’s (2003) model critically 
depends on the possibility of market entry. Yet, several barriers kept new firms from the market. 
First of all, opening a new mine was very costly. The initial sunk costs were several million 
Marks. In addition, exploration techniques were less developed than today; therefore opening a 
new mine was very risky. Finally, the 1903 cartel treaty explicitly mentioned strategies to bar 
new firms. The cartelised firms bought unexploited coal fields, and the RWKS was authorized to 
start a price war if non-cartelised firms entered the market. 
It turns out that productive inefficiency is influenced significantly by bonus payments to board 
members, whereas the financial structure of corporations is insignificant in explaining effi-
ciency.
28 Nevertheless, performance-related managerial compensation was much more strongly 
used in cartelized firms. The level of shares in profits paid before and after cartel formation dif-
fered significantly. Before cartel formation, the average board received 3.7 percent of company 
profits. After cartel formation in 1893, the board of a non-cartelised company received a share in 
profits of 2.5 percent, whereas the board of a cartelised firm received a share in profits of 3.6 
percent on average.  
At first glance, the coefficient measuring the efficiency gains of managerial compensation seems 
to be quite small. An increase of bonus payments to the board by one per cent reduces technical 
inefficiency by about 0.0035 percent. Yet, the monetary equivalent of technical inefficiency is 
much larger than the value of bonus payments. On average, about 73,000 Mark were paid out as 
a bonus to the board. Thus, an increase of one per cent equals about 730 Mark. This compares to 
‘average costs’ of a firm of about 193.7 million Mark.
29 Mean inefficiency of a firm is about 
11.7 per cent, or 22.66 million Mark. Therefore, a 0.0035 per cent reduction of technical ineffi-
ciency equals about 790 Mark. Thus, the cost reductions are slightly higher than the additional 
bonuses paid. Thus, it seems that managers adjusted their efforts to generate higher profits via 
reduced costs according to the incentives set in their working contracts.  
VI.   Conclusion  
One pillar of the accepted view of the economic history of the German Empire is that it was a 
nation of cartels. There is some truth in this view, since several hundred cartels existed in pre-
World War I Germany. Moreover, at least from 1897 onwards, cartel agreements were judicially 
                                        
28   This finding has some relevance for industrial economics in general, since the empirical literature on the 
relationship between management compensation and productive efficiency is sparse; see Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2005) and Beak and Pagan (2002) for recent contributions.  
29   ‚Average costs‘ are calculated as the market price of coal times the output of a firm less the accounting prof-
its.  20 
enforceable, facilitating the foundation and durability of cartels. However, the economic conse-
quences of cartels and their impact on German industrialisation have not been fully identified.  
Standard theory suggests that cartels should lead to excess profits for cartelized firms. The redis-
tribution of the consumer surplus to producers and the aggregate decline in output should induce 
social losses. In addition, in a world with asymmetric information between owners of a cartelized 
mining corporation and managers, the latter group must be motivated by incentives. Otherwise, 
managers could use market power to enjoy a quiet life, instead of the hard life of profit-
maximising agents. If so, reduced product market competition in a cartelised country can induce 
companies to become less cost efficient.  
Recent research has produced conflicting views regarding the effects of cartels in general and the 
RWKS in particular on firm performance in the German Empire. First, Wengenroth (1998) and 
Feldenkirchen (1982: 113) hypothesised that cartelised firms lost flexibility in enacting a dy-
namic corporate strategy and therefore the cartel hampered the growth of total factor productivity 
and the static cost efficiency of the cartelised corporations. Second, Bittner (2002, 2005) showed 
that the formation of the RWKS is invisible in the stock market returns of the firms forming the 
cartel. This supports a hypothesis of Born (1985: 44). According to him, the RWKS was unim-
portant for the development of coal mining in the Ruhr area since it was neither successful in 
increasing output prices nor in reducing the rate of output growth. Third, Pierenkemper (2000: 
236, 244) hypothesised that the cartel was successful since it stabilised coal prices and led to 
higher revenues for the cartelized companies. Moreover, since the price was fixed by the RWKS, 
the only mechanism available to managers to increase firm profits was cost reduction. Therefore, 
cartel formation induced higher cost efficiency. 
The findings of our paper mostly agree with the intermediate position taken by Bittner (2002, 
2005) and Born (1985): The formation of the RWKS did not have a measurable effect on the 
technical efficiency of the cartelised firms. Yet, we can also partly support Pierenkemper’s 
(2000) claim that cost reduction was a successful strategy, at least if managers of the firms par-
ticipated from the increased firm profits. Jointly and severally, even the supposedly most impor-
tant cartel in Imperial Germany did not have a measurable impact on the technical efficiency of 
cartelised firms. Therefore the relevance of cartelisation on the German industrialisation might 
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Appendix 1: Data sources  
 
Average Costs in Marks  Der Deutsche Ökonomist, 1883-1889 
Jahrbuch für den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, 2-14, 
1894-1922 
Average Revenues in Marks  Der Deutsche Ökonomist, 1883-1889 
Jahrbuch für den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, 2-14, 
1894-1922 
Coal Output in tons  Huske (1987) 
Jahrbuch für den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, 2-14, 
1894-1922 
State Archive Münster, Bestand Oberbergamt Dortmund, 
No. 88-101 
Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinen-Wesen im 
preussischen Staate, 30-41, 1882-1893 
Labour Input  Huske (1987) 
Jahrbuch für den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, 2-14, 
1894-1922 
State Archive Münster, Bestand Oberbergamt, No. 88-
101 
Capital Input in Marks  Saling’s Börsen-Jahrbuch. Zweiter (finanzieller) Teil, 5-
38, 1881-1914 
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Appendix 2: Sample of mining corporations  
 
No. Firm  RWKS
1  Years 
1  Aplerbecker Aktien-Verein für Bergbau  1893  1882-1913 
2  Arenbergsche AG für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb  1893  1881-1913 
3 Bochumer  Bergwerks-AG  1893  1881-1913 
4  Bochumer Verein für Bergbau und Gusstahlfabrikation  1903  1881-1913 
5 Bonifacius  1893  1881-1898 
6 Concordia  1893  1891-1913 
7 Consolidation  1893  1890-1913 
8 Courl  1893  1891-1898 
9 Dannebaum  1893  1890-1899 
10 Dortmunder  Bergbau-AG  1893  1881-1894 
11 Essener  Steinkohlenbergwerke  1907  1907-1913 
12 Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerks-AG  1893  1881-1913 
13 Harperner  Bergbau-AG  1893  1881-1913 
14 Hibernia  1893  1881-1913 
15  Hörder Bergwerks- und Hüttenverein  1903  1881-1906 
16 Hoesch  1903  1902-1913 
17 Hugo  1893  1890-1894 
18 Kölner  Bergwerks-Verein  1893  1881-1911 
19 König  Wilhelm  1893  1881-1913 
20 Louise  Tiefbau  1893  1881-1907 
21 Magdeburger  Bergwerks-AG  1893  1881-1913 
22 Massen  1893  1891-1910 
23 Nordstern  1893  1890-1906 
24 Phönix  1903  1897-1913 
25 Pluto  1893  1881-1898 
26 Rheinische  Anthracit-Kohlenwerke  1893  1890-1905 
27 Rheinische  Stahlwerke  1903  1901-1913 
28 Union  1903  1881-1910 
1 Beginning of membership in the RWKS. 
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Appendix 3: Calculation of capital stock at replacement costs 
Following Lindenberg and Ross (1981), the replacement cost (RC) of a firm at time t is the sum 
of three summands: 
•  the total assets of the firm at this time (TAt), 
•  the difference between the firm’s net plant at replacement cost in period t and the historic 
value of its net plant in the same period (RNPt – HNPt), and 
•  the difference between the firm’s inventories at replacement cost in period t and the his-
toric value of its inventories in the same period (RINVt – HINVt). 
The inventories summand drops out, because contemporaries used to price their inventories at 
recent prices (Rettig, 1978) so that a firm’s inventories at replacement cost are equal to the his-
toric value of its inventories (RINVt = HINVt,).The amount of total assets and the net plant at his-
torical value are taken directly from the balance sheets. The net plant at replacement costs is cal-
culated by a recursive estimation procedure that accounts for investment, depreciation, price 
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φ: Change of capital goods price index 
δ: Depreciation rate 
θ: Rate of technical progress 
I: Investment 
 
The capital goods price index is approximated by Hoffmann’s (1965) machine price index; the 
rate of technical progress by the residual of a growth accounting exercise of the industrial sector 
(Burhop and Wolff, 2005). The depreciation rate was calculated by dividing the depreciation in 
period t by the historical net plant in the preceding period; investment by subtracting the histori-
cal net plant in period t–1 from the historical net plant of the subsequent period and adding the 
depreciation of period t. 